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Abstract 
 
The paper argues that capital adequacy regulation has served to recreate the neoliberal form 
of capitalist social relations.  It identifies two dimensions to this process.  First, the paper 
argues that financialization has become increasingly important for securing political 
legitimacy in several states, and that capital adequacy regulation in historical perspective can 
be understood to have incentivized, facilitated, and legitimated the kind of arbitrage that 
allow it to proceed.  Second, it argues that in the contemporary context, revisions to capital 
adequacy requirements serve to discipline mutual and co-operative forms of finance by 
encouraging them to engage more explicitly in profit-seeking, introducing a homogenizing 
dynamic into the financial sector despite regulators’ belief that systemic diversity is a key 
feature of promoting stability.    
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Introduction: 
 
The collapse of the international financial system in 2007 and 2008 understandably prompted 
debates about the way in which states regulate global financial markets in general, and capital 
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adequacy requirements for banks in particular.  These requirements, as Howarth and Quaglia 
(2013, 313) have phrased it, ‘have traditionally been regarded as one of the main instruments 
to ensure the stability of the banking sector and hence financial stability tout court’.  More 
holistically, commentators have focused on the ideational shift towards macro-prudential 
regulation (Baker 2012; Baker 2014)—the regulation of the system as a whole—the degree to 
which regulation has been ‘captured’ by financial elites, and the way in which new regulations 
have been subjected to the demands of national governments and bank lobbies, resulting in 
differential implementation across states (Baker 2010; Howarth and Quaglia 2013; Buckley, 
Howarth and Quaglia 2012; Rethel 2014).  However, the central contention of regulators in 
the aftermath of the crisis has been that more stringent capital adequacy requirements and a 
macro-prudential approach that focuses on the system as a whole rather than simply 
individual firms can produce stability.  
 
This paper scrutinises and critiques this claim.  The paper follows accounts of the expansion 
of finance’s contribution to the economy and its role in everyday life—often referred to as a 
process of financialization—that argue this process has reflected attempts to revitalize 
accumulation on a legitimate basis (Harvey 2005; Kotz 2008).  It argues that capital adequacy 
regulation and revisions to that framework recreate capitalist social relations in their 
neoliberal form, which is characterized by the expansion of markets and competition and has 
relied on financialization in order to provide it with legitimacy by increasingly replacing state 
provision with asset ownership and debt as the keystones of welfare provision (Crouch, 2009; 
Finlayson, 2009). 
 
It identifies two dimensions to this process, examined in two sections.  In the first section, it is 
argued that  the historical development of capital adequacy regulation can be understood to 
have created the conditions for financialization to proceed by incentivizing, facilitating, and 
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legitimating regulatory arbitrage—the processes through which ‘a bank takes the opportunity 
to be regulated by a more “accommodating” regulator and to exploit differences between 
regulatory regimes’ (Rethel, 2014, 72).  It shows how, counter-intuitively, the capital 
adequacy framework can be understood to have incentivized and facilitated a specific form of 
regulatory arbitrage—regulatory capital arbitrage—where ‘cosmetic’ adjustments can be 
made to balance sheets in order to lower effective risk-based capital requirements through 
the process of securitization (Jones, 2000, 36).    In the second section, the paper outlines 
more specifically ways in which capital adequacy regulation can be understood to recreate 
capitalist social relations by showing how recent revisions have served to discipline mutual 
and cooperative finance, which are member rather than share-holder owned and have not 
traditionally been geared primarily towards profit seeking.  This discipline has placed 
institutions of this form under pressure to surrender their mutuality, either in principle or in 
practice.  This disciplinary effect not only has the effect of recreating capitalist social relations 
by incentivizing profit-seeking behaviour, it is counter-intuitive because it contributes to the 
homogenization of the financial system despite regulators’ stated aims of encouraging 
systemic diversity.  
 
Capital Adequacy and Capitalist Finance 
 
Harvey (2005, 19, original emphasis) has described the process of neoliberalization as ‘a 
political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the 
power of economic elites’, a key feature of which has been the increase in financial 
transactions undertaken in ‘speculative and predatory style’ (ibid., 161).  For Kotz (2008, 16), 
this financialization has been marked by a gradual divorce of the financial from the non-
financial economy rather than its dominance over it, and he suggests that ‘financial 
deregulation set the financial sector free, allowing the process of financialization to develop’, 
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particularly in the period 1980-82 (ibid., 8).  This paper agrees with these analyses, but notes 
that it was not simply the deregulation of finance in the early 1980s that has contributed to 
the development of financialization as part of the political process of neoliberalization.  It also 
shows how the continued re-regulation of finance has played an important part in this 
process. This section of the paper outlines the evolution of capital adequacy regulation and its 
relationship to other kinds of regulation like accounting standards, to show how it can be 
understood to have contributed to the development of capitalist social relations in the 
neoliberal form by incentivizing, facilitating, and legitimating regulatory arbitrage. 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards (BCBS 1988) was putatively designed in order to 
strengthen the global banking system by imposing capital adequacy requirements on banks.  
This operated by assigning assets a risk weighting which would determine the amount of 
capital banks would have to hold against those assets, a system which was revised to 
incorporate the marketization of risk management (and therefore capital adequacy 
requirements) and strengthen market-discipline (see BCBS 1999) following the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997.  The collapse in sub-prime mortgage markets and the systemic 
contagion that followed from the running down of many financial institutions’ highly 
leveraged positions then provided a strong rationale for further re-regulation.  Substantively, 
the Basel III agreements made capital adequacy requirements more stringent by tightening 
the definition of core capital on the basis of the view that banks with sufficient levels of ‘good 
quality’ capital would be able to withstand future stresses.  This means that ‘the predominant 
form of Tier 1 capital must be common shares and retained earnings’ (BCBS 2010, 2).  Basel 
III also suggested that national regulators incorporate a leverage ratio in order to guard 
against pro-cyclical deleveraging during times of stress (ibid., 4) and proposed capital 
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conservation buffers to ensure ‘banks build up capital buffers outside periods of stress which 
can be drawn down as losses are incurred’ (ibid., 54).   
 
The evolution of capital adequacy regulation reflects a dominant narrative: ‘Good regulation 
was understood not to interfere with the functioning of the market’ (Rethel and Sinclair 2012, 
82-3).  Most significantly, the intellectual foundations of capital adequacy regulation lie in the 
belief that holding more capital will reduce risk, and that risk is something that can be 
effectively measured and managed in order to prevent destabilizing periods of crisis.  This 
dominant narrative was reflected in claims that the crisis stemmed from the abuse of the 
regulatory system by financial elites who were able to ‘capture it’, producing a situation 
where ‘bureaucrats, regulators and politicians cease to serve some notion of a wider collective 
public interest and begin to systematically favour specific vested interests, usually the very 
interests they were supposed to regulate and restrain for the wider public interest’ (Baker 
2010, 648).   This narrative is also reflected in the fact that ‘Many observers have argued that 
the regulatory framework prior to the financial crisis was deficient because it was 
“microprudential” in nature’, rather than trying ‘to safeguard the system as a whole’ (Hanson 
et al 2011, 3).  
 
The response to this narrative of the crisis in policy-making circles has therefore emphasized 
the significance of macroprudential regulation geared at safeguarding the system as a whole, 
reflecting a view that the ‘correct’ regulation can create conditions for financial stability.  
Baker (2012, 2) is right to note that the acceptance of macroprudential regulatory paradigms 
by policy-makers represented ‘a startlingly rapid ideational shift’ in the reregulation of 
finance.  However, a simple focus on the notion that the shortcomings of regulation were 
unintended consequences of the system’s design rather than inherent features of it ignores 
the fact that opportunities for arbitrage that allowed for the expansion of finance served the 
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interest of domestic state managers in countries like the US and the UK, because allowing for 
the expansion of finance provided for both for the profitability of financial firms and the 
provision of social welfare through debt-financed consumption.    
 
On this matter, Baker (2010, 655) suggests ‘Anglo-American elites face serious disincentives 
in retreating from financialization, securitization and the access to credit and housing finance 
[…] because these processes have become integral elements of the social and welfare 
settlements in these societies.’  As Schwartz (2008, 263) frankly noted, it was ‘cheap 
mortgages [that were] financing the trenches defending against new demands for protection 
in the US and some other countries.’  Moreover, the relationship between the expansion of 
credit and welfare was not just limited to housing, but encompassed a much broader range of 
fields as part of a system that Crouch (2009, 382) has described as ‘Privatised 
Keynesianism’—‘a system of markets alongside extensive housing and other debt among low- 
and medium-income people linked to unregulated derivatives markets’.  In this system, 
revolving short-term debt functioned alongside mortgage debt as the basis for prosperity, 
replacing rising wages, the welfare state, and demand management, which had provided the 
conditions for prosperity in the immediate post-war period (ibid., 392).   At the heart of this 
system has been the cultivation of an ‘asset-owning society composed of responsible yet risk-
taking, financially independent yet economically ambitious individuals’ (Finlayson 2009, 
400), with the effect that individual prosperity is linked not only to home-ownership, but to 
private pensions and other forms of financial investment.   In a context where policies that 
‘have a strong impact on everyday life, such as property, credit, and tax’ play a significant role 
in legitimating relationships between the state and civil society (Seabrooke, 2007, 2), it is 
possible to see that the expansion of financialilzation was not simply a project related to 
creating conditions for the accumulation of capital, but also a key way of legitimizing that 
project.   
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In the context of the tensions domestic state managers face between creating conditions for 
profitability while maintaining political legitimacy, there are clear incentives to allow 
regulatory arbitrage that facilitates the expansion of finance to occur.  This is because it allows 
state managers to both seek and retain mobile capital in their search for competitiveness, and 
because the extension of finance to broader social groups can help negotiate political tensions 
that might otherwise stem from the welfare state retrenchment that has increasingly formed 
part of governments’ response to competitive pressures.   From such a perspective, it is 
possible to reject a technocratic focus on weaknesses in the form of regulation and argue that 
capital adequacy regulation has served to recreate capitalist social relations by incentivizing, 
facilitating, and legitimating regulatory arbitrage of the kind from which the crisis stemmed.  
 
The first way in which capital adequacy regulation might be understood to have served to 
recreate capitalist social relations is by incentivizing risk-taking behaviour in the quest for 
profitability.  Ostensibly, the notion that banks should hold higher levels of capital is to ensure 
that they have enough in reserve to draw down in the event of impairments, and therefore 
prevent insolvencies.  The notion that this should reduce risk in the system appears intuitive.  
However, an alternative analysis can show that the notion that more capital equals less risk is 
a non sequitur because of the dynamic nature of banking. As Jürg Blum (1999, 755-6) explains,  
‘In a regime of binding capital requirements the amount that can be invested in the 
risky but profitable asset is restricted to a multiple of the value of equity.  This implies 
that an additional unity of equity leads to an additional investment larger than one unit 
in the risky asset.  Due to this ‘leverage effect’ equity is more valuable to a regulated 
bank. A bank facing binding capital rules therefore has a higher incentive to increase 
equity tomorrow.  However, if a bank finds it prohibitively costly to raise additional 
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equity in the capital market or is completely unable to do so, the only way to increase 
the amount of equity tomorrow is to increase risk today.’ 
Effectively, capital adequacy regulations place a premium on equity as the core component of 
good quality loss-bearing capital with the effect that on the one hand, ‘If future profits are 
lower, a bank has a smaller incentive to avoid default’, and on the other, ‘In order to raise the 
amount of equity tomorrow it may be optimal for a bank to increase risk today’ (ibid., 755).  
This perspective suggests that capital adequacy regulation may introduce perverse incentives.  
In combination with other apparently perverse incentives, like the ability to generate fee 
income from ‘originate to distribute’ models of lending which allow for risk to be shifted, 
undermining prudent approaches to lending, and banks’ much criticized bonus cultures 
(Crotty, 2009, 565), it is possible to see how capital adequacy regulation might be understood 
to complement a broad range of regulations that incentivize risk-taking rather than limiting 
risk.   
 
The incentivization of risk-taking behavior would not, however, serve to legitimately re-
create capitalist social relations in their neo-liberal form unless regulatory structures are 
constructed in a way that facilitates it by creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage to 
occur.  The fact that apparently strong capital adequacy positions have not historically 
translated into institutional resilience is one illustration of the fact that arbitrage of this kind 
has been widespread.  As Alfon et al (2004, 5) have shown, the majority of UK banking 
institutions routinely held ‘considerably more capital than that required by the regulatory 
authorities’ in the early 2000s.  They estimated that for banks the excess capital held above 
that required by the regulator was 50 per cent, and for building societies, 31 per cent (ibid., 
9).  Nonetheless, these institutions were not insulated from the crisis because regulations 
allowed for securitization, which meant liabilities could be held off-balance sheet in forms 
that allowed institutions to avoid holding capital against them.   
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Jones (2000, 1) has labeled the process through which financial institutions have been able to 
reduce their capital requirements through securitization as ‘regulatory capital arbitrage’, a 
process through which ‘securitization and other financial innovations [create] opportunities 
for banks to reduce substantially their regulatory measures of risk, with little or no 
corresponding reduction in their overall economic risks’.  In effect, securitization allowed 
financial institutions to repackage risks into assets with lower effective regulatory-based 
capital requirements than the underlying assets.   As Crotty (2009, 568-70) noted, capital 
adequacy regulation encouraged banks to hold securities like Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDOs) that had lower requirements than trading assets, while insuring the income streams of 
CDOs against default through the purchase of Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) shifted risk outside 
of the core capital adequacy framework to institutions not covered by it and which were not 
required to set capital aside to cover potential losses.  The extent to which regulatory capital 
arbitrage of this kind has been widespread is clearly indicated by the high levels of 
securitization, as shown by the increasing volume of asset backed securities issued in the 
United States in the run up to 2008, shown in Figure 1.   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The way in which regulation allowed for financial innovation to shift risk outside of the core 
capital adequacy framework was intrinsically dependent on the way in which capital 
adequacy regulation interacted with accounting standards.  For instance, Lehman Brothers’ 
use of Repo 105 transactions, in which temporary asset repurchases were classified as sales 
in order to reduce liabilities for the purposes of reporting, served to obfuscate the degree of 
leverage on financial institutions’ balance sheets.  The use of Value at Risk (VaR), which 
assesses the probability of loss exceeding the investment portfolio over a given time period, 
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also had an inherent tendency to suggest lower capital requirements, since the use of short-
term time-horizons meant that assessment of risk was minimal during boom periods (ibid., 
571).  As Marieke de Goede (2004, 211) phrased it, VaR ‘models are ultimately dependent on 
(sophisticated versions of) the normal distribution (or bell curve) in their prediction of future 
scenarios’, which means ‘they have difficulty considering the possibilities associated with the 
tail end of the curve’, a problem compounded because of its reliance on the availability and 
accuracy of historical data (ibid., 211).   These problems were exacerbated and underscored 
by the Basel II arrangements by its acceptance of an internal ratings based approach to 
assessing capital requirements for ‘some sophisticated banks’ (BCBS 1999, 13), which 
effectively allowed them to use their own models to assess their exposure to credit, 
operational and market risk.  
 
The clear message is that capital adequacy regulation can only be effective if all banking 
activity is covered by it, and accounting standards dovetail with capital adequacy regulation 
to reflect the spirit as well as the letter of the regulation, to prevent their circumvention.  
While Basel III has attempted to address some of these issues by proposing a leverage ratio 
that accounts for off-balance sheet exposures, as well as providing for greater supervision of 
off-balance sheet activity, its effectiveness will be entirely reliant on the application of these 
standards by domestic regulators and the evolution and interpretation of accounting 
standards, as well as the resistance of non-banking financial institutions to measures aimed to 
bring them under the capital adequacy rubric.  
 
On the first matter, it is clear that significant national differences on the implementation of the 
Basel Accords exist (Rethel, 2014, 82), which are reflected in the conflicts between member 
states of the European Union over its legal form.  On the second matter, problems remain 
because while the International Accounting Standards Board moved quickly to re-classify 
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Repo transactions as secured borrowings rather than as sales (IASB 2010), competition 
between accounting firms means that there is no reason to believe that differing 
interpretations of standards will not result in similar obfuscation in the future.  Indeed, the 
increasing levels of fees paid by Lehman Brothers to its auditors in the years when it was 
using Repo 105, as well as the ‘revolving door’ between accounting firms and their clients in 
terms of staffing, have been cited as reasons why auditors were happy to agree that such 
transactions fell within their interpretation of accounting standards (Wall Street Journal 
2010).   
 
Problems for capital adequacy regulation stemming from divergence in international 
accounting standards are also manifested in differences between jurisdictions.  For instance, 
the International Accounting Standards Board new standard on loss reporting—IFRS 9—
which stipulates that banks must provide for expected losses rather than realized losses, does 
not apply to the United States (which fails under the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles) and raises the prospect that institutions based in different jurisdictions will report 
against different standards (Financial Times 2014).  The potential for cross border arbitrage 
to continue here is clear.  Difficulties in capturing financial activity within the capital 
adequacy framework have also already emerged, for instance in the form of Prudential 
Financial’s appeal against being labeled a systemically important financial institution by the 
United States government, along with AIG and GE Capital (Financial Times 2013).   
 
Rethel and Sinclair (2012, 97) are therefore correct to note that the development of 
regulation reflects the ‘fallacious thinking that we can prevent future banking crisis by 
regulating against a repeat of the most recent crisis’.  This is because regulating against past 
regulatory arbitrage or regulatory capture does nothing to address the competitive dynamics 
from which incentives for new forms of arbitrage arise, or to close the gaps between different 
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regulatory jurisdictions and standards that allow it to occur.  Even if existing regulatory gaps 
are narrowed or closed, competition within the financial services industry is likely to lead to 
the opening of new gaps as firms attempt to innovate their ways to greater profitability.  But 
more significantly, the neoliberal form of capitalist social relations’ reliance on the extension 
of finance for their legitimation (Baker 2010; Crouch 2009; Finlayson 2009, Schwartz 2008; 
cf. p. 4-5) suggests that there are significant difficulties and disincentives to preventing these 
forms of arbitrage, and explains the ways in which the historical evolution of capital adequacy 
regulation has served to recreate capitalist social relations by incentivizing and facilitating 
arbitrage that has allowed financialization to proceed.  
 
The political plausibility of the incentivization and facilitation of regulatory arbitrage 
discussed above is nonetheless contingent on the legitimation of the dominant forms of 
financial activity, which, in the face of repeated crises, it might be expected would come under 
threat.   However, the extent to which the ideas underscoring the extension of finance have 
insulated it from this kind of threat have been much discussed, as ‘technocratic’ discourses of 
‘the economy’ appear to place matters relating to finance beyond the realms of the political.  
As Crotty (2009, 565) phrased it, ‘Support for lax regulation was reinforced by the central 
claim of neoclassical financial economics that capital markets price securities correctly with 
respect to expected risk and return’, despite the fallacious nature of this claim.   As Marieke de 
Goede (2004, 200) notes, the historical evolution of the concept of risk—as distinct from 
uncertainty—has ‘provided the possibility of a demarcation line between gambling and 
finance’ while serving to frame risk ‘as natural on the one hand, but humanly calculable on the 
other’.  As such, the way in which the concept of risk itself has been incorporated into the 
regulatory framework has served to legitimate the extension of risky practices, with a strong 
institutional structure incorporating its own perverse incentives underscoring it.  This centers 
on the role of credit-ratings agencies, and in particular the conflicts of interest that stem from 
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the ‘issuer-pays’ business model (see Helleiner & Pagliari 2009, 279; Mullard 2012)—in 
which the issuer of a security pays ratings agencies for the rating—as part of a process 
through which ratings themselves have served to ‘normalize a fictitious bifurcation between 
the ‘economy’ and ‘politics’ in the constitution of what counts as authoritative knowledge in 
the market’ (Paudyn 2012, 3).   
 
This section has discussed the ways in which capital adequacy requirements can be 
understood to have recreated neoliberal forms of capitalist social relations by incentivizing, 
facilitating, and legitimating regulatory arbitrage that has allowed for the development of 
financialization.  In particular, it has shown how ideas about the relationship between capital 
adequacy and risk, between capital adequacy regulation and accounting standards, and 
conceptual and practical approaches to measuring ‘risk’ itself, have somewhat counter-
intuitively mitigated against the creation of stable forms of finance.  In the process, it has 
served to consolidate the ‘common sense’ of capitalist forms of finance geared towards the 
maximization of shareholder value in spite of its tendency towards instability.  
 
Capital Adequacy and Mutual Finance 
 
The previous section showed how the capital adequacy framework can be understood to have 
recreated capitalist social relations by establishing a framework that incentivizes, facilitates, 
and legitimates regulatory arbitrage.  This can be explained by virtue of the fact that states 
like the United States and the United Kingdom have become more dependent on the extension 
of finance for domestic political legitimation, and can therefore be understood to have been 
dependent on the kinds of opportunities for arbitrage the capital adequacy framework has 
provided.  This section of the paper shows how revisions to the capital adequacy framework 
following the crisis—in particular the redefinition of Core Tier 1 capital—can be understood 
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to recreate capitalist social relations by disciplining the mutual sector.  It begins by briefly 
addressing the issue of diversity and the extent to which regulators’ have identified it as an 
important way of creating systemic stability.  It then discusses the issue of discipline in 
relation to the European mutual sector in general, and the case of the UK Cooperative Bank in 
particular.  It shows how new regulations can be understood to encourage such firms to 
surrender their mutuality either in principle or in practice.  In combination, it argues that this 
demonstrates that revisions to the capital adequacy requirements can be understood to have 
a counter-intuitive impact in terms of regulators’ aims to promote systemic diversity and 
encouraged the development of specifically capitalistic forms of financial activity focused on 
profit-seeking.  
 
Mutuals and Systemic Diversity 
 
Discussions about the progressive nature of cooperative or mutual forms of ownership and 
control have a long history.  Bruno Jossa (2012, 401-2) has shown how thinkers including 
Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, John Stuart Mill, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and even in certain 
passages of his work, Karl Marx, believed that cooperatives might contribute to the rise of a 
new mode of production.  While such grand claims have not recently been made of financial 
cooperatives or mutuals, which are owned by their members and operated in their interest, 
following the crisis, regulators have nonetheless implied an important role for them because 
one of their key objectives has been to address macroprudential risk in the system by 
encouraging systemic diversity.  This has been understood as a way of creating strength in the 
system because in the event one or more firms experience stress, the stress will not affect all 
firms simultaneously and result in the seizure of inter-bank lending and a credit-crunch on 
the grounds that different kinds of firms will be holding different classes of assets depending 
on their appetite for risk (see Michie 2011, 311).   
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As a report written on behalf of the UK Building Societies Association (BSA 2009, 1) has 
phrased it, there is an advantage to 
‘having a mix of institutions with different portfolio structures [because this has] the 
potential to reduce overall systemic risk because institutions are not homogenous.  
The more diversified a financial system is in terms of size of ownership and structure 
of business, the better it is able to weather the strain produced by the normal business 
cycle, in particular avoiding the bandwagon effect, and the better it is able to adjust to 
changes in consumer preferences.’ 
This kind of advocacy of diversity of corporate structures is not simply a reflection of the 
sectional interests of mutual firms.  The desire to limit herd-behavior is also reflected in the 
views of high profile officials, like the Chief Economist of the Bank of England, Andrew 
Haldane.  Allessandri and Haldane (2009, 9) have noted that before the crisis many financial 
institutions diversified their business lines and ‘For banks individually, this made sense.  It 
helped reduce the idiosyncratic risk from individual business lines.  Pre-crisis, this strategy 
seemed the epitome of sound banking.’    
 
However, Allessandri and Haldane (ibid., 10) go on to note that this kind of behavior, which 
makes sense at the level of individual institutions, produces undesirable consequences at the 
systemic level.  They note, 
‘for risk across the system as a whole, this strategy has systemically dangerous 
consequences.  By increasing the similarity of banks’ asset portfolios, it increases the 
system’s sensitivity to aggregate fluctuations.  Although diversification may purge 
idiosyncratic risk, it simultaneously reduces diversity and therefore increases systemic 
risk.’   
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This does not mean that complex financial institutions should not be required to hold higher 
amounts of loss-absorbing capital—they should be forced to do so because it ‘lowers the 
chances of them contracting disease, thus heading off its contagious consequences (Haldane 
and May 2011).  In order to foster systemic stability then, it should follow that the regulatory 
framework should require large complex financial institutions to hold bigger capital reserves 
in order to reduce the likelihood of systemic contagion in the event of failure.  It should also 
encourage the development of different corporate structures, which are likely to be involved 
in different kinds of financial transactions and hold different kinds of assets.   
 
While achieving the objective of increasing capital reserve levels, the new capital adequacy 
requirements actively and counter-intuitively discourage the development of systemic 
diversity by disciplining financial firms, like mutuals and cooperatives, whose primary 
objective is not to maximize profit.  The Basel III requirement that Core Tier 1 capital is 
constituted of common equity and retained earnings is particularly problematic because 
financial firms organized on a mutual or cooperative basis ‘do not issue normal shares’ (BPCE 
et al 2010, 1).  In fact, many of the 14 criteria Basel III uses to define Tier 1 capital contradict 
the principles of cooperative ownership.  For instance, they require shareholders to have a 
right to a liquidation surplus (criteria 2) that cooperatives do not offer because ‘the capital 
was invested for the purposes of financing the production tool, and not in order to generate a 
profit’ (ibid., 6).  The requirements that the payment of dividends not be subject to caps 
(criteria 5) also means that the system ‘favours the dispersal of profits to the detriment of the 
establishment of reserves’ (ibid., 9), which not only undermines the ability of mutuals to 
generate and retain Tier 1 capital, but also seems to contradict Basel III’s intention to 
establish bigger capital buffers for systemically important firms.  As the UK Building Societies 
Association (2010, 2) noted, ‘criteria 2 and 5 are repugnant to the international cooperative 
principles of disinterested distribution and limited interest on capital.’ 
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The European Union’s (EU) regulation on prudential standards for credit institutions, which 
establishes the legal framework for the implementation of the Basel III recommendations 
within the EU, goes some way to addressing these concerns by allowing mutuals to impose a 
cap on distributions and limiting claims on the residual assets of institutions under certain 
circumstances (see EU, 2013, L321/44-5).  In doing so, the translation of Basel III 
recommendations into EU law stops short of institutionalizing a definition of Tier 1 capital 
that is anathema to cooperative principles contained in the Basel III recommendations.   
However, this concession still does not address the fact that mutuals cannot issue common 
shares and therefore face greater difficulties in acquiring loss-bearing capital as it is defined 
by regulation. The emphasis on Tier 1 Capital means these firms must increase retained 
earnings or create equity-like instruments that meet the definition of Tier 1 Capital.  The 
former imposes a form of market-discipline on mutuals because it encourages them to engage 
in more explicitly profit-seeking behavior to generate sufficient retained earnings, while the 
latter imposes market discipline by forcing institutions to become more responsive to the 
demands of investors in equity-like instruments.  
 
As HM Treasury (2010, 7) noted, the problem in relation to retained earnings is acute in the 
low interest rate environment that has prevailed since the crisis since it puts ‘pressure on 
interest rate margins for organizations such as retail banks or building societies that earn 
income on the difference between the interest rate they borrow at from retail depositors and 
wholesale funding providers, and the interest rate they lend at for mortgages and other types 
of loan.’  This problem was further amplified by the divorce of wholesale funding costs from 
bank-rate.  In part, this might be because ‘institutional investors have perceived building 
societies to be a higher risk and therefore expect a higher rate of return on their investments’ 
(ibid., 8), however, it is equally plausible that the higher cost of capital incurred by mutual 
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financial institutions stems from market perceptions about their profitability than their risk 
profiles, which are generally considered to be more conservative than joint-stock banks 
(Hesse and Cihak 2007, 21).   
 
The fact that the new capital adequacy framework requires all financial institutions to hold 
capital that is particularly expensive for mutual and cooperative firms therefore has the 
potential to make it increasingly difficult to compete in the marketplace, unless they are 
willing to increase their risk profiles in order to generate higher returns that will allow them 
to continue offering rates of interests that are competitive for depositors and borrowers.  
Given that the ethos of these institutions aims to prioritize both their ability to provide value 
for money for their members and to protect an intergenerational endowment, the competitive 
squeeze stemming from the need to generate increased retained earnings places them in a 
difficult position vis-à-vis their mutuality.  Should such firms take the decision to try and 
increase their profitability by extending their range of activities, the system would have 
effectively encouraged them to become more like joint-stock banks pursuing a business model 
aimed at maximizing surplus.  Ironically, not only would this represent a clear encroachment 
of a capitalist ethos on an alternative economic space, it would stand in stark contrast to 
regulators’ stated aim of increasing systemic diversity. 
 
The emphasis on retained earnings therefore seems to require mutuals to engage in more 
explicitly profit-seeking behavior, and given their primary focus on intermediation, 
potentially sharpens any possible maturity or interest rate mismatches between institutions’ 
assets and liabilities. In this respect, the new capital adequacy requirements can be 
understood as a form of prudential regulatory discipline that has sharpened the existing 
market-discipline faced by financial mutuals, and in the process contributed to the recreation 
of capitalist space by encouraging more explicit profit seeking among them.  If mutuals choose 
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not to engage in more explicitly profit orientated activity to bolster earnings that can be 
retained to meet capital requirements, they must consider alternative ways of meeting them, 
which might include issuing equity like instruments.  In sum, then, revisions to the capital 
adequacy framework appear to require mutuals to either adopt more profit-orientated 
business models, or use instruments more typical of joint-stock banks.       
 
While regulators in the United Kingdom have shown a keen awareness of this issue, it has not 
been framed as a problem.  As the Bank of England (2013, 54) noted, ‘The overall impact on 
mutuals of the CRD IV proposals will not be substantially different from that of similar sized 
(non-mutual) institutions.’  This is because, although ‘Mutuals cannot issue equity’, they ‘will 
be able to issue common equity-like instruments to meet their core requirements (as allowed 
by Article 27 of the CRR)’ (ibid., 54).   In the next breath, the Bank (ibid., 54) notes that the 
relatively less diverse business models of mutuals is likely to mean that any reduction in risk-
weighted assets ‘may therefore affect profitability’, without acknowledgement that this also 
negatively impacts on the ability to generate retained earnings—their core source of Tier 1 
capital.  The Bank’s (ibid., 54) suggestion that ‘mutuals’ existing business strategies take this 
inertia in their ability to adjust their balance sheets into account by generally holding larger 
surpluses of capital resources over their total regulatory requirements than other types of 
firms and will help mitigate the cost of higher capital requirements’  effectively appears to 
suggest—self-referentially—that the impact of higher capital adequacy requirements on 
mutuals will be negligible because mutuals tend to hold more regulatory capital than required 
anyway.   
 
This position is at once replete with contradiction and dismissive of the problem.  This is 
because it suggested that mutuals can generate retained earnings and reduce risk-weighted 
assets, even though the reduction of risk-weighted assets is likely to have a negative impact 
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on their ability to generate retained earnings, and because it assumes that mutuals are in 
general already well capitalized. However, in the justification that mutuals can issue equity-
like instruments to meet Tier 1 capital requirements there is a far more active way in which 
more explicitly capitalistic social relations are encouraged, because it suggests that mutuals 
can avoid capital adequacy difficulties by becoming more like joint-stock firms.  
 
The British Treasury noted the emergence of three kinds of new capital instruments that 
mutual financial institutions could use to ‘enhance their capital base […] to ensure they can 
withstand stress’ (HM Treasury 2010, 21).  The first, Profit Participating Deferred Shares 
(PPDS) is an instrument that provides for a fixed percentage of profits to be offered as a 
dividend on a discretionary basis when the mutual makes a profit, but the value of which can 
be written down in the event it incurs losses.  The instrument was used in order to assist with 
the recovery of the West Bromwich building society in 2009 and was characterized by British 
regulators as Tier 1 capital, although the Treasury has noted that the instrument has faced 
problems of marketability, which are understandable given the qualification on an investors’ 
upside, but the real downside risk (ibid., 21).  
 
The second, Contingent Convertible Notes, is essentially a debt instrument that coverts into 
equity at a specific trigger point.  As subordinated or senior debt at the point of issue ‘with a 
fixed coupon and a fixed maturity date’, Contingent Convertible Notes ‘would not increase 
Core Tier 1 capital at the point they were issued’ (ibid., 21).  However, the convertibility of 
these debt instruments into equity at times of stress would provide contingent access to Tier 
1 capital under these circumstances, and The Yorkshire Building Society issued notes of this 
kind as parts of its merger with the Chelsea Building Society.  Finally, Rabobank Contingent 
Notes were issued in March 2012 and are ‘subject to write down at a specified trigger, 
producing Core Tier 1 capital at the point of write down’ (ibid., 21).  In the case of Rabobank, 
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this meant that the Notes would ‘act in the same way as normal bonds until a specified 
threshold is breached.  Once the threshold is breached […] the principal value of the notes 
could be written down by 75 per cent, with the remaining 25 per cent being returned to the 
investors’ (ibid., 22).  Rabobank would therefore be able to retain the 75 per cent write down 
as Core Tier 1 capital.   
 
These various kinds of convertible and contingent bonds mean that mutuals have ways of 
raising capital that attempt to respect the fundamental aspects of their mutuality.  However, 
in practice, the structure of these bonds means that mutuals must be more responsive to the 
demands of investors rather than members in order to market them.  Mutuals are therefore 
encouraged to take on more characteristics of joint-stock firms in relation to profit-seeking 
activity, since return on investment is likely to be a strong motivating factor for the purchase 
of such assets.  The dilution of the mutual ethos is likely to occur regardless of whether or not 
bond-holders are prevented from having a disproportionate direct influence on business 
strategies by imposing one-member-one-vote rules, since the need for mutuals to raise more 
capital means they must anticipate the demands of investors, or risk being unable raise 
required levels of regulatory capital.   
 
The Case of The Co-Operative Bank 
 
Each of these instruments has some of the characteristics of debt and some of the 
characteristics of equity, and through the issuance of instruments that are more like equity, 
mutuals become more reliant on the preferences of equity investors, which have traditionally 
been profit maximizing. The new capital adequacy framework has therefore disciplined 
mutuals through its emphasis on Core Tier 1 capital.  However, more significantly than the 
issue of equity-like instruments by several mutuals, new capital adequacy regulation has also 
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played a major role in creating the difficulties of the UK Co-Operative Group, which was forced 
to relinquish a 70 per cent stake of the Co-Operative Bank to private investors in order to fill a 
£1.5 billion1 shortfall in its capital holdings in October 2013.   
 
The full picture of the Co-Operative Bank’s troubles is complicated.  For instance, its merger 
with the Britannia Building Society in 2009 added a significant proportion of bad loans to its 
mortgage book (Guardian 2013a), and the bank incurred losses from compensation payments 
for the mis-sale of Payment Protection Insurance, as well as IT write offs (Guardian 2013b).  
More fundamentally, questions have been asked about management at the bank, and it has 
been argued that it ‘was absurd that the Financial Services Authority did not insist that the Co-
Op Bank have a chairman who knew something about banking’ (ibid.).  However, despite 
these clear problems, it is nonetheless the case that the capital shortfall emerged in the 
context of the more stringent capital adequacy requirements imposed by British regulators 
following the Basel recommendations.  
 
On this matter, the Co-Operative Group’s former Chairman, Peter Marks, informed the 
Treasury Select Committee’s inquiry on the matter that the bank’s auditors had assured him 
that it faced no going concern issues as late as February or March 2012 (UK Parliament 
2013a).  When asked whether ‘this £1.6 billion hole appears from nowhere’, Marks responded 
that the capital shortfall has two characteristics.  First, that ‘what we are seeing now is 
assumptions about the loan book based on judgment’, accounting for capital impairments of 
£859 million (ibid.) and which the former Chief Executive of the Co-Operative Bank, David 
Anderson has noted, as ‘Losses [that] as yet have not really arisen’ (UK Parliament 2013b).  
On the second characteristic, it is worth quoting Marks’ evidence at length:  
                                                        
1 The figure £1.5 billion and the figure £1.6 billion have been reported in Treasury select 
committee hearings.  This article repeats the figures as they have been provided to these 
committees 
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‘The other part of the £1.5 billion, bearing in mind that I had left by the time this came 
out was, I believe, the regulators saying that all banks need to keep more capital.  We 
know, don’t we, that all the big banks have been raising capital to meet that 
requirement.  The Co-Op was in a difficult position.  It cannot raise equity capital.  The 
bank board, myself included, believed that we had more time to build capital and that 
we would not be subject to what appears to be the acceleration of, first, the 
provisioning for risk in a loan book and secondly, building up […] capital […] I am not 
criticizing the regulator.  I think he has shifted the goalposts because of what has 
happened over the last few years […] What I am saying is that the goalposts have well 
and truly been shifted’ (UK Parliament 2013a).  
While it is important, as Marks recognized, not to shift all the blame from the Co-Operative 
Bank, placing its troubles in context is essential, and reveals a far more nuanced picture than 
impressions of a £1.5 billion capital shortfall emerging from bad loans overseen by 
unqualified managers.  
 
At least part of this nuanced picture is of a financial institution engaged with regulators who 
had ‘healthy scepticism’ about the merger with Britannia, before reaching the conclusion that 
‘their capital position, combined with ours, put us in a better position that we were in on our 
own with all the other factors associated with merging’ (UK Parliament 2013b).  Quoting the 
Economic Secretary’s remarks to Parliament, Andrews noted that the Treasury believed ‘The 
success of the merger resulted in a strongly capitalized mutual business with the scale to offer 
its customers and members a full range of financial services products that are ethical, mutual, 
and co-operative’ (ibid.).  Another part of this nuanced picture is an institution judiciously 
provisioning for potential losses in its loan book, in the context of generalized losses across 
the banking sector, which in the case of The Co-Operative Bank, are comparable with other 
financial institutions—as figure 2 shows, its impairments as a percentage of its loan book in a 
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single year have never exceeded the level of impairments suffered by the Royal Bank of 
Scotland in 2009.   
 
(FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
 
What has made the case of the Co-Operative unique is the fact that it has structural 
constraints in its ability to raise capital that created increasing difficulties in the context of an 
increasing regulatory burden.  That is not to say that the Co-Operative Bank’s affairs were 100 
per cent secure—all banks at all times suffer write downs of one kind or another—however it 
is the case that the new regulations created a much heavier burden for mutual finance that 
has come at the cost of The Co-Operative Bank’s mutuality.  In the process of creating another 
joint-stock bank, the disciplinary impact of the new capital adequacy framework and its 
counter-intuitive character are exposed.  Not only is this a small step towards increasing 
homogeneity in the financial sector, it is a homogeneity that prioritizes profit-seeking and the 
maximization of shareholder value, and therefore the creation and recreation of specifically 
capitalistic social relations.  
 
While the case of The Co-Operative Bank might seem relatively isolated, and is not simply a 
product of the Basel framework but also European and national pressures that have emerged 
out of the way national regulators have implemented it, the problem is not trivial.  As data 
from the European Association of Co-Operative Banks (EACB 2013) shows, co-operative 
banks accounted for over 20 per cent market share of deposits and loans in several European 
countries at the end of 2013.  This is problematic in the context of existing pressures on 
mutuals that have resulted in a number of mergers that has reduced the number of building 
societies in the United Kingdom by 10 in the period 2007-2010 (Birchall 2010, 115), 
reflecting a secular decline from 1723 societies in 1910 to 47 in 2012 (BSA 2014).  As figure 3 
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demonstrates, concentration of the building societies sector in the UK has shown a consistent 
upward trend since 1995 in terms of the percentage assets held by the largest 5, largest 10, 
and largest 20 societies.  As the sector itself becomes more concentrated, the potential for the 
new capital adequacy requirements to have a large impact on systemic homogeneity is 
significant since the demutualization of one of the larger institutions would significantly 
reduce the size of the sector overall.  
 
(figure 3 about here)  
 
This section has argued that despite regulators’ desire to increase systemic diversity, the 
application of capital adequacy requirements to mutual firms is potentially homogenizing 
because these firms cannot raise equity, have increasingly sought to introduce equity-like 
instruments, and in the case of The Co-Operative Bank, relinquished its mutuality.  In the 
context of competitive pressures that have led to increasing concentration among large 
mutuals in the United Kingdom, the potential for this disciplinary and homogenizing dynamic 
to have significant consequences is very real.  In light of competitive pressures that have the 
potential to encourage profit-seeking behavior as mutuals try to strengthen their reserves, 
and the tendency to address capital adequacy requirements through the creation of equity-
like instruments for mutuals, revisions to capital adequacy requirements have added 
regulatory discipline to existing market discipline in a way that encourages mutuals to 
surrender their mutuality either in principle or in practice.  In this sense, capital adequacy 
regulation can be said to have served to re-create capitalist social relations by consolidating 
the profit motive and privileging the maximization of shareholder value as the primary 
motivation for financial activity.   
 
Conclusions 
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The paper has argued that capital adequacy regulation and revisions to that framework have 
contributed to the recreation of capitalist space.  In the first section, it discussed the ways in 
which the capital adequacy framework can be understood to have incentivized, facilitated, 
and legitimated regulatory arbitrage.  Moreover, it suggested that these tendencies can be 
understood as a function of the extent to which states—including the United Kingdom and the 
United States—have become increasingly reliant on the expansion of the financial sector to 
create the conditions for political legitimation through the process of financialization.  The 
second section argued that revisions to the capital adequacy framework following the 
financial crisis have added a regulatory discipline to existing market discipline working on 
mutual financial institutions.  It showed how the definition of Tier 1 capital has been 
responded to with a search for equity-like instruments for mutual firms, which counter-
intuitively makes them more like joint-stock banks despite regulators’ stated preference for 
increasing systemic diversity.  The paper argued that this constitutes a recreation of capitalist 
social relations by entrenching incentives toward profit-seeking in firms whose primary 
objectives have historically not been focused on pecuniary gain.  It showed how this 
disciplinary impact can be understood to have contributed to the surrender of The Co-
Operative Bank’s mutuality, and suggested that given the existing market-share and 
concentration of the mutual sector, if these disciplinary forces are not addressed, the financial 
sector will become more rather than less homogeneous.  The clear implication is that 
regulators should not be placing an emphasis on mutuals’ ability to adapt to the capital 
adequacy framework, but on their own ability to adapt regulation to accommodate this 
different form of financial activity.  It is only by doing so that it could be argued regulators 
have acted to the full extent of their ability to encourage macroeconomic stability by creating 
conditions for systemic diversity.   
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Figure 1: Asset-Backed Securities issued in the United States (US$ Billion) 
 
Source: OECD (2010) OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics 
http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/3010061ec101.pdf?expires=1450347769&id=id&acc
name=guest&checksum=C1AB28B71E5C28D0FFF4EE0E22DF2EDD  
Data Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/823272536016 
 
Figure 2 RBS and Cooperative Bank Loss Impairments as % of Loan Book 
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Sources: Compiled from Annual Reports for RBS and The Co-Operative Bank 
Figure 3 Share of Total Assets of UK Building Societies 
 
Source: statistics available from BSA https://www.bsa.org.uk/statistics/sector-info-
performance/sector-information 
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